Symposium: The Market for Corporate Control in the Zone of Insolvency
8:45 a.m.: Registration and breakfast
9:15 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.: Program
RSVP Online by Wednesday, February 28
About the Symposium
Solvent companies trade subject to the relatively well-developed law of mergers and acquisitions, informed by a robust scholarly literature on the market for corporate control. Insolvent companies trade too, sometimes in bankruptcy and sometimes in its shadow, regulated instead by a bankruptcy court and federal bankruptcy law.
While it is easy to assume that markets are markets, there are important differences: markets for distressed assets are less robust and may be distorted by a short-term financial crisis; information may be scarce; creditors may gain the practical power to shut down the business by withholding goods and services, cutting off credit, or exerting control over key assets. Chapter 11 seeks to impose an orderly governance structure, but, even once a firm has filed, control rights trade at a discount, "blocking positions" may be easier to acquire, and creditors’ economic interest may not be transparent.
This symposium will compare and contrast the dynamics of the market for corporate control in these two distinct contexts and consider whether they justify differences in legal treatment.
View the agenda and panel participants
Sponsored by the Center for the Study of Business Law & Regulation and the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law
9:15 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.: Program
RSVP Online by Wednesday, February 28
About the Symposium
Solvent companies trade subject to the relatively well-developed law of mergers and acquisitions, informed by a robust scholarly literature on the market for corporate control. Insolvent companies trade too, sometimes in bankruptcy and sometimes in its shadow, regulated instead by a bankruptcy court and federal bankruptcy law.
While it is easy to assume that markets are markets, there are important differences: markets for distressed assets are less robust and may be distorted by a short-term financial crisis; information may be scarce; creditors may gain the practical power to shut down the business by withholding goods and services, cutting off credit, or exerting control over key assets. Chapter 11 seeks to impose an orderly governance structure, but, even once a firm has filed, control rights trade at a discount, "blocking positions" may be easier to acquire, and creditors’ economic interest may not be transparent.
This symposium will compare and contrast the dynamics of the market for corporate control in these two distinct contexts and consider whether they justify differences in legal treatment.
View the agenda and panel participants
Sponsored by the Center for the Study of Business Law & Regulation and the Brooklyn Journal of Corporate, Financial & Commercial Law